Descartes does not, then, wish to claim on the basis of the Second Meditation reasoning alone that he knows that only thought and nothing corporeal pertains to his nature. On the other hand, he is not at this point of the argument restricting himself to an epistemically provisional conclusion like "as far as I now know I am a thinking thing and only a thinking thing". For instance, he is implicitly claiming to know, not merely that he thinks, but that thought pertains to his nature or essence: it "cannot be separated from me".1 Also, he explicitly maintains that reasoning concerning the indubitability of his own exis-tence (the "cogito reasoning") has brought him to the conclusion that he is a true and truly existing thing (res vera et vere existens). The importance of this statement should become clear later.
The Second Meditation contains at least one other assertion that is important to the epistemological argument: that Descartes has a clear and distinct idea of himself as a thinking thing (apart from any concept of the corporeal). He begins to hint at this point immediately after the statements already cited. And at the end of the Second Meditation, after arguing that his best knowledge of a typical physical object-a piece of wax-is derived from reason rather than sense, he concludes: I won't try to eludicate in any detail the distinction between clear and distinct conception and "mere" conception. The distinction can, however, be partly brought out by the example of a geometrical proof. Call the conclusion of a given proof T. After one has examined (or constructed) the proof, one distinctly conceives or perceives that T. Before one has examined (or constructed) the proof one will, very likely, have been able to conceive that T : that is, one will have been in the state of thinking that it might be the case that T. Being able (merely) to conceive that T does not in any way preclude also being able (merely) to conceive that not-T. Clearly and distinctly conceiving that T, on the other hand, does preclude being able clearly and distinctly to conceive that not-T.
Between In lieu of detailed analysis of this passage-for which there is no space here-I will merely propose a provisional reading of Descartes's argument which seems to me natural: We need not dwell here on the problems with this argument, for (I trust) it is perfectly obvious that the argument we have quoted from the Sixth Meditation is not a version of it. Whatever may be the connection in Descartes's mind between his inability to doubt his own existence while doubting the existence of body, it is not successfully captured by this unsound reasoning.
According to another objection, Descartes's argument can, show at best that mind and body are possibly or potentially distinct (would be distinct if God should choose to separate them)-not that they are distinct. This objection fundamentally misses Descartes's point. Descartes holds that "two" things are really distinct if it is possible for them to exist in separation. On this view actual distinctness does not entail actual separateness.
A third common criticism of Descartes's treatment of the distinctness of mind derives from the claim that, under sufficient conditions of ignorance, one can conceive almost anything. Thus, the fact that we can conceive that p does not entail that p is even possible: all that follows (at best) is that we have not yet noticed any contradiction in p. But, as our previous discussion indicates, Descartes would turn this objection aside by pointing out that his argument is not based on mere conceivability, but on clear and distinct conceivability. One cannot ignore this crucial distinction without radically misunderstanding his position.
I do not wish to claim that the appeal to the distinction between clear and distinct perception and mere perception raises no problems of its own. It raises, of course, the important question of how one recognizes clear and distinct perceptions. I will not attempt to evaluate this problem here. Instead I will turn to a criticism of Descartes's use of the notion of distinct perception in the epistemological argument that is, unquestionably, more directly relevant than the objections mentioned above. He goes on to observe that Arnauld's triangle example is not effective against him, since it "differs from the case at hand" in making no use of the notion of "complete knowledge" in the sense that Descartes originally intended.
Arnauld's basic objection was that for all Descartes knows, some other attribute, such as extension, might be necessarily implicated in his essence together with the known attribute of thought; the only way of eliminating this possibility is to establish that one knows all the properties of the self. Descartes's position, however, is just that since he recognizes that thought is sufficient "for me to subsist with it alone", he thereby knows no other attribute is necessary. To claim that thought and extension are different, and that either is sufficient to determine a complete or true thing, is already to deny the possibility of some "hidden" necessary dependence of a thinking thing on the attribute of extension. Thus a "complete knowledge" in Descartes's originally intended sense is sufficient for the epistemological argument to go through.
We may now obtain a clearer understanding of the intended relation between the Second Meditation and the Sixth-indeed Descartes seems finally to make this relation explicit in the important passage I have quoted from the reply to Arnauld. The cogito reasoning and its immediate sequel are intended to establish, precisely, that "mind can be perceived clearly and distinctly, or sufficiently so for it to be considered a complete thing, without any of those forms or attributes, from which we recognize that body is a substance . . How good (or bad) is the epistemological argument when interpreted in the way that (as I maintain) Descartes intended it? Well-to mention only one problem-it is at the very best no better than the distinction between clear and distinct perception and "mere" perception. And while I have made some attempt to clarify this distinction, I must admit to distrusting it very radically. (Though I do not know whether recent essentialists' appeals to intuition are on any better ground.) On the other hand, the argument seems to me stronger and much more carefully thought-out than Descartes's critics-contemporary or recent-have generally recognized. In particular, Descartes's reply to Arnauld is so direct and apposite that there can be, I think, no justification for repeating and endorsing Arnauld's objection without giving serious, systematic consideration to the reply.5 6 
